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AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO DENY
PASSPORTS
Since 1941 it has been unlawful for a United States citizen to leave
the western hemisphere without a passport.' Issuance of passports is con-
trolled by the Department of State and administered by its Passport Of-
fice.2 In the past decade, the Secretary of State has claimed authority to
deny and has denied passports where, in his opinion, the national interest
required it.3
Of the cases which have arisen in the federal courts as a result of
these denials, one of the most important is the recent case of Briehl v.
Dulles.3a Briehl, a psychiatrist, applied to the Department of State for re-
newal of his passport for purposes of attending international mental health
congresses at Geneva and Istanbul. The Passport Office requested him to
furnish an affidavit as to past or present membership in the Communist
Party in accordance with section 51.142 of the Passport Regulations of the
Secretary of State.4 Briehl refused and the Passport Office announced a
tentative denial of his application under section 51.135 of the Regulations
which places restrictions on the issuance of passports to "persons supporting
[the] Communist movement." At a subsequent informal hearing Briehl
1. The United States passport has been defined as "a document of identity and
nationality issued to persons owing allegiance to the United States and intending to
travel or sojourn in foreign countries." 3 HACKWORTH, DIGrST OP INTISRNATIONAL LAW
435 (1942). See DEPARTMZNT OP STATS, TnS AmmRiCAN PASSPORT 3-6 (1898). Through-
out most of American history a passport was a convenience and not a necessity to
foreign travel. Id. at 3, 4, 46, 54. Since 1815, however, Congress or the Secretary of
State has made it illegal, with certain exceptions, to leave the country without a valid
passport during each of our major wars. 3 STAT. 199 (1815) ; DEPARTMtNT o STATS,
op. cit. supra at 50; 40 STAT. 559 (1918), 22 U.S.C. §§ 223-26 (1952) (implemented
by Presidential Proclamation No. 1473, (1918)). The act of 1918 was extended to
"national emergencies" in 1941. 55 STAT. 252 (1941), 22 U.S.C. § 223 (1952), super-
seded by 66 STAT. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (b) (1952). Despite the general requirement
of a passport, there are still a few western hemisphere countries where passports are
not required either by the United States or the visited country. Since, however, most
countries today require passports for entrance, passports would remain a necessity for
foreign travel even if it were made lawful to leave the United States without one.
Comment, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues and Judicial
Review, 61 YALn L.J. 171-72 (1952); -earings Before Subcommittee No. 1 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 24, at 27 (1956).
2. 44 STAT. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1952) ; 22 C.F.R. § 51.101 (1949).
3. See Comment, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues
and Judicial Review, 61 YMiX L.J. 171, 174-78 (1952).
3a. 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. granted sub twm. Kent v. Dulles, 26
U.S.L. W=as: 3166 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1957) (No. 481).
4. 22 C.F.R. § 51.142 (Supp. 1957).
5. Id. § 51.135.
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again declined to execute the affidavit, whereupon the Passport Office in-
formed him that it knew of no further action which it could take in his be-
half. Briehl then brought an action in the District Court for the District of
Columbia to compel the Secretary of State to renew the passport. A
motion by the Secretary for summary judgment was granted 6 and the
court of appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed 5-3, holding that the regulations
invoked by the Secretary were valid and Briehl, by failing to file the affi-
davit required by them, had disqualified himself for a passport.
The Secretary of State has long claimed an almost unlimited discre-
tion to deny passports on the grounds that (1) the Executive has inherent
power to act independently in foreign affairs, and passport regulation is a
legitimate exercise of the foreign affairs power; and (2) the Legislature
has delegated to the Executive in broad terms whatever authority it pos-
sesses in this area.7 The purported congressional delegation is based prim-
arily on a 1926 statute, the relevant provisions of which do not set forth
any standards for executive action but state simply that the Secretary
"may grant . . . passports under rules and regulations established by the
President." 8 The Secretary, in promulgating the substantive regulations
invoked in the Briehl case, purported to base the statutory authorization
for them only on this act; 9 but the majority of the court found the
Secretary's substantive statutory authorization reaffirmed in a 1952 act
which, also without establishing clear standards, makes passports neces-
sary for foreign travel.'0
Judicial interpretation of the limits of the Secretary's discretion in is-
suing passports was notably lacking until after World War II.11 Prior to a
6. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
7. Brief for Appellee, p. 29, Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957); 3
HAcKWORTHr, op. cit. scpra note 1, at 467-70. See Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.)
692, 698 (1835).
8. 44 STAT. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1952); Brief for Appellee, p. 29,
Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957). A related statute restricts issuance of
passports to persons owing allegiance to the United States. 32 STAT. 386 (1902), 22
U.S.C. § 212 (1952). The authority conferred on the President was exercised through
Exec. Order No. 7856, 3 FED. REG. 799 (1938) ; see also 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.1-.77 (1949).
Aside from the requirement that American passports may be granted only to persons
owing allegiance to the United States, the President's regulations are largely procedural
in nature. Section 51.75 authorizes the Secretary "in his discretion to refuse to issue
a passport," and § 51.77 empowers the Secretary to make "regulations on the subject
of issuing . . . or withdrawing passports additional to the rules in this part and not
inconsistent therewith."
9. The Internal Security Act of 1950 provides that a member of a registered
communist-action organization or an organization finally ordered to register under
the act is not entitled to a passport. 64 STAT. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1952).
However, no such final order has yet been issued. See Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Bd., 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
10. Based on a statute of 1941, the statute in its present form provides, that
. it shall, except as otherwise provided by the President, and subject to such limi-
tations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, be unlawful for
any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from
or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport." 66 STAT. 190, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1185 (b) (1952).
11. In one of the few pre-war challenges of the Secretary's discretion the Su-
preme Court precluded denial of a passport solely on the basis of an erroneous deter-
mination of citizenship or non-citizenship. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
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few months before entry of the United States into the war, the absence of
a passport did not confine the citizen to the Americas except in time of
war, 2 and there is little evidence that the Secretary had denied passports
to any but a very limited class of persons during peacetime. 13 With the
advent of the post-war period, however, the Passport Office began deny-
ing passports solely on the ground that the "best interests" of the United
States required it,14 unsuccessful applicants, who were generally granted
neither hearing nor further explanation,'5 sought judicial relief. One of the
first tests of the "best interests" refusals was Bauer v. Acheson:16 Al-
though the court seemed to assume a broad discretion in the Secretary to
deny passports, it ruled that this discretion was not unlimited since it con-
flicted with the right of the individual to travel abroad, a right protected
by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. It therefore interpreted
the 1926 statute to require notice and an opportunity to be heard before a
passport may be denied.17 Later decisions have elaborated upon the
procedural safeguards to be afforded the applicant and have held that such
standards for denial as are adopted by the Secretary must be applied equit-
ably. In Nathan v. Dulles 18 and Clark v. Dulles, 19 the court held that an
informal investigation and correspondence between the applicant and the
State Department did not meet the hearing requirement. Boudin v.
Dulles 20 and Dayton v. Dulles 2 1 decided the factual findings sufficient to
bring the applicant within one of the classes to be denied passports de-
scribed in the Passport Regulations are necessary before the Secretary
may deny a passport under the authority of those regulations. In Kraus v.
Dulles 2  it was held that before the court would consider whether the
Secretary could require the applicant to show that he could support him-
self abroad, the Secretary had to show satisfactorily what the Depart-
ment's policy was in regard to a "means" test and how such test was ap-
12. See note 1 supra.
13. "As a general rule the Department bases the issue of a passport on purely
citizenship grounds, although this is not an inflexible rule and is modified in individual
cases based upon the particular facts in each case." The Department of State to the
Consul General at Barcelona, Nov. 18, 1933, MS. Dept. of State, file 138/3224, quoted
in 3 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 512. For cases where passports were denied
on grounds other than lack of citizenship prior to the end of World War II, see id.
at 498-512, 530-32.
14. The "best interests" refusals generally involved persons with alleged connec-
tions of one kind or another with international communism. Comment, Passport Re-
fiesals for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues and Judicial Review, 61 YAI. L.J.
171, 173-78 (1951).
15. Ibid.
16. 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
17. Id. at 451-52.
18. 129 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C. 1955).
19. 129 F. Supp. 950 (D.D.C. 1955).
20. 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
21. 237 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
22. 235 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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plied.2 Shachtman v. Dulles,24 the first of the cases to apparently deal with
the substantive authority of the Secretary to deny passports rather than
with procedural due process problems, held that it was a violation of sub-
stantive due process to deny a passport solely on the grounds that the ap-
plicant was a member of an organization improperly listed as subversive
by the Attorney General.2 5 But though it stated that such a denial would
be arbitrary and "without a reasonable relation to foreign affairs," the
court did not rule on whether the passport should or should not be issued
in the event of a proper determination by the Attorney General nor did it
otherwise consider the validity of the Secretary's Regulations.2 6 The case
could be said to stand only for the proposition that the Secretary must give
reasons for denial sufficient to bring the applicant within the Regulations.
Nathan, Clark, Boudin, Dayton, Kraus and Shachtinan assumed broad
discretion in the Secretary to deny passports but rejected the notion that
this discretion is absolute by providing the applicant with certain largely
procedural safeguards. Procedural safeguards mean little, however, if ulti-
mately the Secretary may refuse a passport on virtually such substantive
grounds as he deems sufficient. The more basic question of the Secretary's
authority to establish substantive standards was for the first time brought
into sharp focus by the Briehl decision. In affirming denial of Briehl's
passport for failure to provide an affidavit, the court upheld the validity
of the requirements for passport eligibility embodied in the Regulations to
which the information sought in the affidavit was relevant. 27 The court did
not clearly delineate the scope of the Secretary's authority. It found merely
that its source was in the foreign affairs area and that the totality of power
in this area is possessed by the executive and legislative branches of the
Government.28 Such power as Congress may have, it delegated to the
Secretary through the President by statute. The court believed its scope of
review limited to a determination of whether the Secretary "so far violated
constitutional prescriptions or specific constitutional limitations as to cast
his action outside the exceedingly broad boundaries within which he is free
to act without judicial review." 29 Finding justification for the Regulations
in question in the dangers presented by the international Communist
movement, the court concluded that the interests of the Government out-
weighed those of the individual. 30
Of the claimed bases of the Secretary's right to formulate substantive
standards, the first is the Executive's inherent power to act independently
23. Existing departmental regulations do not provide for a "means" test for ap-
plicants. 22 C,F.R. §§ 51.101-.143 (Supp. 1956).
24. 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
25. The procedural posture in which the case reached the court required it to
construe the facts most favorably to the applicant. Id. at 942.
26. Id. at 943.
27. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F2d 561, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
28. Id. at 566.
29. Id. at 568.
30. Id. at 575-76.
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in foreign affairs. Courts have established that this power does not
preclude them from taking cognizance of passport cases, but they claim,
as in Briehl, that it narrows the scope of the inquiry.3' In practice, since
the Bauer decision the courts have closely scrutinized several largely
procedural facets of the Secretary's authority, 32 and the inherent power
doctrine has lost much of the force it presumably once had in passport
cases. It still frequently appears in the language of the opinions, however,
and seems to have retained sufficient vitality to serve as a make-weight in
the process of balancing the equities in each case.
The inherent power doctrine developed from judicial reluctance to
intervene in problems arising from Executive policy decisions pertaining
to relations between the United States and foreign governments. Courts
have refused to interfere in matters concerning recognition of foreign
governments, 33 determination of disputed sovereignties,3 4 termination of
treaty obligations,35 and prohibition of the sale of munitions to certain
countries.36 But these cases, as noted by Judge Bazelon dissenting in
Briehl, did not involve a situation "'where the Executive action was speci-
fically directed at restraining the freedom of a particular individual.' "3
They can thus be distinguished from the cases arising from passport de-
nials and do not compel the conclusion that the Secretary's discretion in
the passport area is absolute, i.e., that the court is without power to review
the merits of his decisions. It is true that the use of a passport can have
an impact upon foreign affairs. But to the extent that eligibility require-
ments for a passport restrict certain individuals in the exercise of their
31. The Briell court stated: "There are of course in any government formed
upon a constitution residual areas within which the judicial branch may act in respect
to a power even so unfettered as is the executive power in foreign affairs. If the
President were in gross defiance of constitutional limitations, or perhaps even of con-
gressional prohibitions, the judiciary might act .... It must be kept in mind that the
power of the judiciary to inquire is vastly different from its power to act. A court
often has jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction. The books are full of
cases in which the courts have examined with meticulous care complaints alleging in-
validity of executive action in foreign affairs. But seldom if ever have the courts
found grounds to impose upon such executive action their own ideas of propriety or
wisdom. So in the case at bar it is not suggested that the court could not entertain a
complaint against the Secretary of State alleging the illegality of his action. The
point is that having examined the allegations the court is without power to act save
in a narrow and limited class of extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 567-68.
32. See cases cited at notes 18-22, 24 supra.
33. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Jones v. United States,
137 U.S. 202 (1890).
34. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
35. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902); Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d
565 (9th Cir. 1954).
36. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
37. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1957). But see Fahey v. Mallonee,
332 U.S. 245 (1947) (delegation without stating standards by Home Owners' Loan
Act of power to provide through regulations for the liquidation of savings and loan
associations) ; Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944)
(statute authorized Commission to fix "just and reasonable" rates for natural gas) ;
Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 476 (1914) (Interstate Commerce Act author-
ized Commission to make exceptions to policy against charging more for short than
for long hauls, but stated no standard), discussed in DAvis, ADMINIsTRA 'rV LAW
§§ 13-14 (1951).
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constitutionally protected rights of freedom of movement and expression 3 8
there appears to be no reason why the same constitutional limitations
should not be applicable to executive regulation as would be applicable to
a legislative restriction of those same rights in related fields.39 That the
nation's foreign interests are involved may provide a reason for some limit-
ation on individual freedom, just as, for example, internal security pro-
vides a reason for some limitation on free speech as in the Smith Act.40
It does not provide a reason for absolute discretion to deny passports be-
ing lodged in the Secretary of State anymore than does internal security
give Congress absolute discretion to limit exercise of the right of free
speech.-" The fact that foreign affairs are involved should not preclude all
judicial review on the merits but should only require that courts give
proper weight to United States interests as opposed to individual interests
when considering whether a particular restraint exceeds constitutional
limitations.
Though the Secretary may not have unlimited discretion to frame
passport regulations, executive control over foreign affairs may confer
some authority on him to prescribe such regulations. Thus, it might be
argued that apart from any statutory grant, the Secretary would have
power to determinate eligibility requirements so long as they did not
contravene constitutional limitations analogous to those imposed on legis-
lative restrictions of personal liberties. Even this limited implication of in-
herent power in the Secretary, however, seems improper in view of the
direct impact its exercise would have upon individual liberties. The
sounder position would require that basic policy decisions with regard to
limitations of this sort be made by Congress, politically a more responsive
body than an administrative officer. The court's role would then be to ap-
38. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 573-75 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Bauer v. Acheson,
106 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D.D.C. 1952); Shachtman v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.
1955) (concurring opinion). See Jaffe, The Right To Travel: The Passport Problem,
Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1956, p. 17; Wyzanski, Freedom To Travel, Atlantic Monthly,
Oct. 1952, p. 66.
39. A test used to decide the constitutional limitations on legislative restrictions
of an individual's freedom of expression is the "clear and present danger" doctrine.
This doctrine was first announced by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919): "The question in every case is whether the words are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
It was accepted by later Supreme Court jurists as a "working principle that the sub-
stantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before utterances can be punished." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
Recent decisions involving the Communist Party have perhaps modified the doctrine
somewhat. In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the Court upheld the
conviction of Communist Party leaders under the Smith Act and four members of the
majority espoused the doctrine as interpreted by Judge Hand in the court below: "In
each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its im-
probability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danget."
183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950). On the basis of this decision it may be that the
danger no longer has to be very imminent, but the recent case of Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), perhaps limits Dennis in this respect by establishing that
speech advocating the overthrow of the Governmhnt cannot be proscribed unless "those
to whom the advocacy is addressed [are] urged to do something, now or in the
future, rather than merely to believe in something... " d. at 325.
40. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (Supp. 1956).
41. See note 39 supra.
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ply established constitutional doctrines to resulting statutes as implemented
by executive regulations 4 2 In so doing it would have the benefit of con-
gressional investigation and consideration as well as administrative know-
ledge and experience. The ultimate determination by the court as to
whether a proper balance had been struck between individual and national
interests should be superior to that possible when only an administrative
officer has weighed the problem in advance of the court. It should there-
fore be declared that the Secretary's authority to determine who shall be
eligible for a passport rests not on any inherent power doctrine but on
statutory grant. Two additional results may follow: the Secretary would
perhaps be restrained by the threat of legislative curtailment of his author-
ity; and the Congress might be induced to give fuller consideration to the
problem than has heretofore been the case.4
The court in Briehl, assuming that some control over that portion of
foreign affairs relating to passports rests in part in Congress, held that such
power as Congress possessed had been delegated by the statutes of 1926 and
1952 to the Executive. The statute of 1926,4 providing that the Secretary
"cmay grant . . . passports under rules and regulations established by the
President," devolved from a similar act of 1856.4 5 A State Department
publication of 1898 indicates that the primary purpose of the act of 1856
was to insure that passports were issued only by the Secretary of State.
46
Legislative history of the 1926 statute gives no indication as to whether
Congress intended to confer power on the Secretary to prescribe sub-
stantive eligibility requirements for a passport or whether it merely in-
tended to confer power to establish appropriate procedures for the issu-
ance of passports. 47 The purpose of the 1952 statute 48 making it unlawful
42. Ibid.
43. Senator Fulbright of Arkansas introduced a bill (S.2770, 85th Cong., Ist
Sess.) on the Senate floor on Aug. 13, 1957, which would authorize the Executive to
deny passports only when (1) "there is good reason to believe that . . . the citizen
or his activities abroad will violate the laws of the United States"; or (2) the citizen
"is a member of the Communist Party or a member of an organization which has
been finally ordered by the Subversives Activities Control Board to register or has
recently terminated such membership under such circumstances as to warrant the
conclusion, not otherwise rebutted by the evidence, that he continues to act in fur-
therance of the interests and under the discipline of the Communist Party or such
organization"; or (3) "the citizen owes the government of the United States money
for previous transportation back to the United States." The bill contains a statement
of policy which provides: "Travel by citizens abroad shall be as free of governmental
restraint as possible consistent with the requirements of national security." 103 CONG.
REc. 13175-77 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1957). The bill was submitted to the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, 103 CoNG. REc. 13173 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1957) but was
not reported out of committee by the end of the session.
44. 44 STAT. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. §211a (1952).
45. 11 STAT. 60 (1856).
46. Legislative history of the 1856 act is sparse. According to the Department
publications, the other main purpose was apparently to restrict passport issuance to
American citizens. DEPARTMENT OV STATE, THE AMERICAN PASSPORT 43-44, 48 (1898).
See Boudin, The Constitutional Right To Travel, 56 COLUm. L. REv. 47. 52-53 (1956);
Doman, A Comparative Analysis: Do Citizens Have the Right To Travel?, 43
A.B.A.J. 307, 308 (1957).
47. 67 CONG. REc. 11705-06 (1926).
48. See note 1 supra.
AUTHORITY TO DENY PASSPORTS
to travel outside the western hemisphere without a passport and found in
Briehl to reaffirm the Secretary's power is also in doubt. Legislative de-
bates on the 1918 act from which the 1952 act's travel control provisions
derive are susceptible of the interpretation that the statute may only have
been designed to place general restrictions on travel to certain countries.
49
The debates on the 1918 bill could also be read, however, to indicate that
Congress may have intended to keep certain citizens from going abroad
during wartime or time of national emergency and made the Secretary the
agent through which this objective was to be accomplished. 50 Although the
language of neither statute compels the result, the court in Briehl elected
to interpret them broadly so as to confer on the Secretary a maximum of
discretion.
If the 1926 and 1952 acts, implemented by executive orders, lodge
in the Secretary broad discretion to deny passports, two problems are
raised. The first is whether the statutes so interpreted represent excessive
delegations of legislative power. And if the delegations are not excessive,
what, if any, constitutional limitations restrict the Secretary's exercise of
that power. Judge Bazelon's dissent in Briehl would have avoided these
issues by adopting a narrower interpretation of the statutes."' It would
have held the 1926 act to merely confer power on the Secretary to pre-
scribe procedural regulations for the securing of a passport 52 and the 1952
act to mean that the President might establish conditions and exceptions
to the prohibition against travel but not that he may "decide which cate-
gories of citizens might receive passports." 53
In only two cases has the Supreme Court declared a federal statute
invalid on the ground that it represented an excessive delegation of legis-
lative authority to an administrative agency.5 4 In a number of cases in-
49. Representative Flood, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
which reported the House bill, replying to questions as to whether the bill would allow
the Executive to proclaim which persons shall or shall not receive passports, stated
that the Executive could make determinations as to "particular places or particular
persons." Since a considerable portion of the debate during which this remark was
made concerned whether the bill would necessitate passports for travel to Canada and
Mexico, it may be that the reference was to "particular persons" desiring to go to par-
ticular countries. 56 CONG. Rxc. 6029-32, 6061-67 (1918); See Comment, The Pass-
port Puzzle, 23 U. CH. L. Rry. 260, 272-73 (1956).
50. Representative Flood said that the purpose of the bill was to give the Execu-
tive power "to control ingress and egress from this country." 56 CONG. Rtc. 6029
(1918). See note 49 supra.
51. Judge Washington, concurring in Brield, suggested, that the court need not
determine the full scope of the statutory grant and the regulations, since the Secretary
had not yet made a final decision on the application but had made only "an official
determination . . . not to render a final decision on the matter because of Dr. Briehl's
refusal at his hearing to furnish an affidavit .... " He concluded that the only ques-
tion raised by the appeal was whether the Secretary may validly require such an
affidavit as a condition precedent to the rendering of a final decision. Briehl v. Dulles,
248 F.2d 561, 576-79 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; cf. Stewart v. Dulles, Civil Nos. 13533, 13622,
13638, D.C. Cir., July 3, 1957 (applicant submitted affidavit that he had not been
Communist Party member at any time during the past fifteen years).
52. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
53. Id. at 582.
54. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) ; Panama Re-
fining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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volving state statutes granting authority to administrative agencies to place
prior restraints on the exercise of first amendment rights, the Court has
found the delegation accompanied by insufficient standards.5 If the 1926
statute is interpreted to confer authority on the Secretary to promulgate
eligibility requirements for a passport, it would seem to fall within the
latter category. Without prescribing standards, it would authorize the
Secretary to restrict an individual in the exercise of his right to move
about freely and to communicate with others while abroad in advance of
a showing that the individual's movement or communication would harm
the United States' interests. This difficulty would seem to dictate a
narrower interpretation of the statute as the dissent in Briehl suggested.
The act of 1952 makes illegal departure from or entry into the United
States without a valid passport "when the United States is at war or dur-
ing the existence of any national emergency proclaimed by the President,
. . and the President . . . find[s] that the interests of the United
States require that restrictions and prohibitions in addition to those provided
otherwise than by this section be imposed upon the departure .. . from
and ... entry into the United States. . . ." , Reference to war or a state
of national emergency in this statute may be a sufficient standard to sup-
port the validity of passport regulations relevant to those conditions. The
court's finding in Briehl that regulations preventing issuance of passports
to communists or communist sympathizers are relevant to the conditions
underlying the subsisting Korean national emergency is probably correct.
57
Thus, though the 1926 statute when read alone and interpreted broadly
may represent an improper delegation of legislative power, the 1952
statute appears to provide the necessary standard to support the Secre-
tary's exercise of authority to promulgate substantive regulations.
Assuming that the Secretary's exercise of authority to frame sub-
stantive passport regulations is supported by valid statutes, there would
remain the problem of determining whether the regulations promulgated
exceed constitutional limitations. This would require a balancing of the
applicant's interests in exercise of his constitutional rights against the inter-
ests of the United States in forbidding travel where it might be expected
to be detrimental to our foreign policy or national defense.58 The court in
Briehl did not face this issue squarely since it found its scope of review
extremely narrow. It is to be hoped that federal courts in the future
will reject this narrowing of the scope of review and permit the making
of a record which will afford them a basis for weighing the competing
interests and determining the validity.of the Secretary's Regulations.
55. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (practice of requiring permits
for public meetings or speeches in public park contrary to first and fourteenth amend-
ments); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (city ordinance giving adminis-
trative official discretionary power to control in advance right of citizens to speak on
religious matters on city streets invalid under first and fourteenth amendments).
56. 66 STAT. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952).
57. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
58. See note 39 supra.
